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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ALBERT B. RUMSEY,
Plain.tiff a;nd Respondent,
-vs.SALT LAKE CITY, a l\1unicipal
Corporation, of the State of Utah,
Defendant and .._Jppellant.

Case
No.10181

BRIEF O·F RESP·ONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE ICIND OF CASE
As stated in appellant's brief this is an action by
plaintiff-respondent for personal injuries resulting from
an accident on a diving board at the Wasatch Springs
Plunge, operated by appellant, Salt Lake City.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The action was tried before a jury in the District
Court and the issues were found in favor of plaintiffrespondent and against defendant-appellant.
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the judgment reversed and
the action dismissed. Respondent asks that the jury
verdict and the judgment of the lower court be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees substantially with appellant's
statement of facts, but adds the following:
Plaintiff-respondent was injured as a result of a
fall from a. diving board at Wasatch Springs Plunge. The
"sticky surface" or safety walk on the end of the diving
board had worn off, leaving the bare metal exposed. A
lifeguard had reported this condition as being dangerous
on February 25, 1963 (T. 7, 20) and again brought the
matter to the attention of the manager on approximately
March 25, 1963 ( T. 12). Nothing was done to repair the
board until after the accident, ""hich occurred on June
26, 1963 (T. 14).
The evidence further showed that plaintiff was completely unaware of the dangerous condition of the diving
board. He had not patronized the pool for approximately
3 to 4 years prior to the date of the accident ( T. 71). He
slipped on the board and the accident occurred 'vhile
making his first dive on the day in question (T. 71).
After the conclusion of the evidence the case was
submitted to the jury with instructions on the issues of
negligence, proximate cause, damages, contributory negligence and assumption of risk (R. 12-46). Appellant took
2

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

no exception to the instructions of the court. The jury
found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded general and
special damages totaling $6,400.00. The injuries suffered
by the plaintiff were substantial and there is no c1a.im
that the damages are excessive.
After the entry of the jury verdict defendant moved
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, alleging
among other things that plaintiff had failed to plead or
prove that Salt Lake City operated W a.satch Springs
Plunge in a proprietary capacity (R. 65). The issue of
governmental immunity was not included or mentioned
in the pre-trial order as an issue to be tried in the case
(R. 8, 9) and the parties stipulated as a part of said pretrial order that plaintiff occupied the legal position of
a. business invitee (R. 8). Also, the unopposed and uncontroverted affidavit of counsel sho,vs that the governmental immunity question was actually discussed at the
pre-trial conference and said defense was abandoned by
defendant (R 70).
In order to remove any possibility of prejudice
against the defendant and in order to correct any possible error resulting from the failure of the pre-trial
order to specifically recite the governmental immunity
issue, plaintiff made a motion to the trial court to clarify
or amend the judgment and grant a new trial on the issue
of governmental immunity (R. 71). In response to this
motion the trial court exercised its discretion to permit
plaintiff to reopen the case and hear further testimony on
this issue. After notice, the matter was heard on J nne
15, 1964, at which time the short undisputed testimony
3
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of City Commissioner Joe Christensen and Pool Manager James A. Nunley was to the effect that the city
charged admissions for swimming, that the city attempts
to derive revenue from the pool, that federal and state
taxes are charged on admissions, that Wasatch Springs
Plunge is operated differently from other city-owned
swimming pools which are operated in connection with
parks and playgrounds, and that the pool is operated in
the same manner as it was during the time 'vhen prior
Supreme Court decisions held the same operation to be
proprietary. The court found from the evidence that the
City of Salt Lake operated Wasatch Springs Plunge in a
proprietary capacity and further granted plaintiff's additiona~ motion to amend his pleadings to conform to
the evidence (T. 114-116; R. 84-85). Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 'vas denied (R. 79-80).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN PER~IITTING PLAINTIFF TO REOPEN THE CASE TO PERMIT FURTHER
TESTIMONY ON THE SUBJECT OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY.
Appellant has cla!med that the court cQmmitted
prejudicial error in permitting plaintiff to reopen .his
case after the jury 'vas discharged. Appeilant relies on
rule 59 (a.), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which ·provides as follows:
''Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties,
4
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and on all or part of the issues, for any of the
following causes ; provided, however, that on mo.:.
tion for a new trial in an action tried without a
jury, the court may open the judgment if one
has been entered, take additional testimony,
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or
make new findings and conclusions, and direct the
entry of a new judgment:''
It is to be noted that the first clause of the above
rule permitting a new trial on part of the issues is not
restricted to non-jury cases, but applies to jury cases as
well. The last clause relates solely to non-jury cases,
there being llO statutory direction 1Vith respect to the reopening of a jury case.
It can be reasonably argued from the language of
the rule that the- intent "\\.,.as to prohibit the reopening of
a jury case with respect to issues upon "\vhich the jury
considered and determined. The reason for such a rule
is obviously apparent. A litigant is entitled to have a
jury pass upon all questions of fact and if the court
"\vere to permit a litigant to reopen a case after the jury
is discharged, such could have the effect of depriving
the party of his right to trial by jury.
The above argument, however, is completely unreasonable and senseless when applied to the reopening of
a case to determine matters not within the realm of the
jury. With respect to such issues the distinction bet,veen
a jury and non-jury case becomes meaningless. In thP
case before the court the only purpose of the reopening·
of the case was to hear additional testimony on the sul.,ject of governmental immunity. It has been uniformly

5
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held that the qustion of "\vhether a municipality is acting
in a governmental capacity is a question of law, to be
decided by the court and should not be submitted to the
jury. Carr v. City and County of Sam Frarn.cisco, 170
Cal. Appeals 2d 48, 338 P. 2d 509; Barrett v. City of
Sa.n Jose, 161 Cal. App·eals 2d 40, 325 P. 2d 1026; Hansen.
v. City of Los Angeles, 147 P. 2d 109. Thus, while it "\vould
clearly have been error for the court to permit the reopening of a jury case to reconsider such questions as
negligence or contributory negligence, it should not be
improper in the exercise of sound judicial discretion to
reopen a jury case to determine an issue solely within
the province of the court and completely outside of the
jurisdiction of the jury.
In the case of M attfeld v. Nester, 226 Minn. 106, 32
N.W. 2d, 291 3 A.L.R. 2d 909, the Minnesota Court permitted the plaintiff after the verdict and the discharge of
the jury to reopen the case and prove that the plaintiff
was the duly appointed administrator of the decedent in
a wrongful death action, a necessary element which plaintiff, through oversight, had failed to prove. It was held
that independent of statute, courts have inherent po,ver
to correct or supply any omissions in the proceeding or
record. The- court further stated as follows:
''Where, as here, the omission relates to a fact
provable by a document of an indisputable and incontrove·rtible nature, the adverse party is denied
no right by reop·ening and receiving such proof,
because even upon the trial the court would have
been bound to preemptorily instruct the jury that
the document spoke for itself and that the jury
6
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had nothing to determine vvith respect to the facts
to \vhich the document related.
. . . Furthermore, the interests of justice re·quire that the proof be received and that the litigation be ended. Courts, both trial and appellate,
in order to prevent the miscarriage of justice resulting from a retrial, for the purpose of proving
a fact, the existence of which can be conclusively
established by an indisputable and incontrovertible document, have the power to reopen the
case to receive such proof even after verdict, and
will exercise the power to sustain a verdict or
judgment where the omission was caused through
inadvertence or mistake of counsel for the prevailing party in failing to offer the proof upon
the trial. (Citation of Cases).''
The above reasoning clearly applies to the case before the court. The evidence offered at the rehearing was
indisputable and incontrovertible and in accordance with
two prior decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, holding
conclusively that this exact operation of the city is of a
proprietary nature. Burton v. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah
186, 253 P. 443; Griffin v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 94,
176 P. 2d 156.
The Utah court has traditionally held that a motion for ne\v trial or a motion to reopen the case is a
matter \Vithin the discretion of the trial court. Numerous cases on this point can be summed up by the following statement from Wasatch Oril Refining Cotnpany v.
Wade, 92 Utah 50, 63 P. 2d 1070:
''A motion to reopen a case for the purpose of introducing further evidence is addressed to tlH•
....,
t
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sound discretion of the court, which will be liberally exercised in behalf of allo,ving the whole
case to be presented, and the granting or refusing
of such motion will not be interfered with in the
absence of a. showing of abuse of discretion.''
There has been no sho,ving of abuse of discretion
in the instant case.
One of the matters which the court in all likelihood
considered in exercising its discretion to reopen the case,
was the affidavit of counsel stating that the question of
governmental immunity was actually discussed at the
pre-trial conference and was abandoned as a defense by
defendant. Rule 59 (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
provides that motions made under said rule after trial
may be based upon affidavits and that the opposing party
shal1 have ten additional days after the filing of affidavits
in which to file opposing affidavits. Plaintiff's affidavit
"\vas not opposed. Where matters are permitted to be
determined upon the basis of affidavits an opposing party
ought to be required to file an opposing affidaYit or at
least make a showing 'vhy he cannot do so; other"ise the
facts in the unopposed affidavit should be taken as true.
Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P. 2d 624. In light
of the facts as stated in the unopposed affidavit it "-ould
seem that the court 'vas acting fair to both parties in
permitting the case to be reopened for testimony on this
issue. Defendant Salt Lake City could not possibly have
been prejudiced by this procedure, it being g·iven full opportunity to defend on the issue of governmental Immunity if any defense \Yere available to it.

8
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Rule 76, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, also can
be cited as additional authority supporting the view that
it 'vas proper for the trial court to reopen the case. This
rule permits the appellate court not only to affirm, reverse or modify any judgment or order, but also the appellate court may ''Direct . . . further proceedings to be
had" in the trial court. Under such a. rule it is generally held that the appellate court may either grant a complete ne'v trial or restrict or limit the issues to be tried
in the lower court or to direct appropriate proceedings
'vhere material issues in the case were not fully litigated
below. · C. J. S. Appeal and Error, Sections 1935, 1942.
The appellate court further can even order pleadings to
be amended where the ends of justice so require. C. J. S.
Appeal and Error, Section 1936. The policy of the la"'"
is to avoid appeals and to permit the trial court to correct
any errors or irregularities which do not prejudice the
rights of the parties. It would thus be unreasonable to
say that the trial court is powerless to do on its o'vn what
the Supreme Court could direct it to do.

POINT II.
THE RECORD IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT AND JURY VERDICT EVEN WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE
ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY OFFERED UPON
THE REOPENING OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE.
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, relating to
pre-trial procedure provides that where a pre-trial conference is held, the court shall make a pre-trial order and
9
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such order, when entered, controls the subsequent course
of the action.
It is uniformly held that where a pre-trial order or
report purports to state the issues to be tried, the trial
should be confined to such issues and other issues are
eliminated from consideration. Annotation 22 A.L.R.
2nd, 599, 603. It is also established that participants in
a pre-trial conference are held to \Vaive issues not there
presented. Annotation 22 A.L.R. 2nd 599, 603. A party
who is advised in the pre-trial order of the issues to be
tried is in no position to claim error as to issues litigated.
Radley v. Smith, 6 Utah 2d 313, 313 P. 2d 465.
The pre-trial order in the instant case purported to
state the issues to be tried in the ca.se. Nowhere in said
order is there any mention of a governmental immunity
issue. To the contrary, the order specifically recited the
stipulation of the parties ''that the plaintiff at the time of
his claimed injuries was a business invitee.'' Stipulations made by attorneys at pre-trial are binding upon the
clients and upon the subsequent course of the trial. Annotation 22 A. L. R. 2d 599, 602.
It is unfortunate that the pre-trial order did not recite in more detail the exclusion of the sovereign immunity issue. However, the unopposed and uncontroverted
affidavit of counsel shows that the rna tter \Vas discussed
specifically and that defendant did not claim such a defense and abandoned the same after a discussion between court and counsel of the Burton Y. Salt Lake C·ity
and Griffin v. Salt Lake City cases, supra, both of said
10
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eases holding that the City of Salt Lake operated W asatch Springs Plunge in a proprietary capacity.
Nor were the pleadings defective inasmuch as plaintilff moved pursuant to Rule 15 (b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, to amend said pleadings and specifically plead
that the City of Salt Lake operates Wasatch Springs
Plunge in a proprietary capacity, and said motion was
granted by the court ( T. 207-209 ; R. 84, 85). The granting
of such a motion by the trial court was proper where there
is no showing that defendant had been misled, or prevented from presenting all of its evidence. Morris v. Russell,
120 Utah 545, 236 P. 2d 451. The rules of Civil Procedure
provide considerable latitude in pleading and proof, so
long as the adverse party is protected from surprise and
assured equal opportunity and facility to prove countercontentions. Taylor v. E.M. Royle Corp., 1 Utah 2d 175,
264 P. 2d 279. Defendant has had full opportunity in this
case to meet all issues and raise all defenses, including
the defense of governmental immunity had such defense
been meritorious.
POINT III.
THE QUESTION OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO TH]J
JURY.
If the defendant Salt Lake City was negligent in permitting the safety walk material at the end of the diving
board to become worn off, leaving slick exposed m_aterial at the end of the board, and if, plaintiff fell and
'vas injured from slipping on the end of the diving board,
11
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it is difficult to see how such negligence could be anything
other than the proximate eause of the injury. Such cause
would be the proximate cause unless there 'vas some
other intervening cause or unless the injury was not reasonably foreseeable. KaltV'aguchi v. Benn.ett, 112 Utah
442, 189 p. 2d 109.
If the facts of any case are such that reasonable men
might draw different conclusions, the question of proximate cause is for the jury. Shafer v. Keely Ice Cream.
Company, 65 Utah 46, 234 P. 300. Certainly here in the
instant case a reasonable peTson might conclude the
foreseeability and likelihood of injury from the negligence of defendant in permitting a. slick exposed condition to remain a.t the end of its diving board. It would
be more reasonable to argue that reasonable minds could
not have reached any other eonclusion and that the court
should have found proximate cause as a matter of la,Y.
The question of proximate cause 'vas submitted to
the jury under instructions which 'vere unobjected to by
defendant and upon which no exceptions were taken. The
instructions "\vere properly given and the issue of proximate cause was properly presented as a jury question and
determined by the jury.

12
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CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that the judgment
and jury verdict of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
NEIL D. SCHAERRER
1300 W a.lker Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff a.nd
Respondent
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